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Since the 1990s there has been considerable concern among policymakers and market participants 
that financial turbulence in emerging markets could endanger the stability of the global financial 
system. In this paper we focus on the 1997 East Asian crisis in order to establish whether it had a 
contagious influence on the developed countries, hence posing a threat to their financial systems, 
given their high exposure to the East Asian region.  The available empirical evidence is mixed. For 
instance, the findings of Braig and Goldfajan (1999) strongly support the contagion hypothesis, 
while Forbes and Rigobon (2002) conclude against contagion in the case of the 1997 Asian crisis, 
as do Bordo and Murshid (2000).
1
We define contagion, following King and Wadhwani (1990) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), as a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries). 
According to this definition, contagion does not occur if two markets show a high degree of co-
movement during both stability and crisis periods. The term interdependence is used instead if 
strong linkages between the two economies exist in all states of the world.  In the empirical analysis  2
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improve on earlier empirical studies by taking the approach introduced by Caporale et al. (2002), 
who test for contagion within the East Asian region by carrying out a full sample test of the stability 
of the system which relies on more plausible (over)identifying restrictions. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 3 
presents the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes the main findings and offers some concluding 
remarks.
2. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The contemporaneous interaction between the stock returns of two countries is modelled by 
estimating the following structural form system: 
 =   +                       (1) A0yt A1yDt et
where   = [ ,  ]  is a vector of two endogenous variables (country-specific asset 
returns) at time  = [ ,  ]  is the vector of the two endogenous variables times an 
intervention dummy D which takes the value of 1 during the crisis period and zero elsewhere;   = 
[ ,  ] is a vector of structural shocks. The matrices describing the contemporaneous interaction 
between the two endogenous variables in calm and turbulent periods are restricted to be:
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Let   be the covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks,   the covariance matrix of the 
structural innovations [ ,  ] , and  the covariance matrix of the innovations to [D y , D y ] . 
Then, we can solve the system (and hence to identify equation 1) and arrive at:
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where we further assume that the covariance matrix for the structural innovations   is diagonal 
with shifts in the variances across, for instance, two regimes (hence the subscript  ), and that 




As shown in Rigobon (2003), heteroscedasticity is sufficient to identify a stable simultaneous 
equation system (which does not include a step dummy): the system given by (2) provides six 
covariance equations (three per regime) and six unknowns (the coefficients a , a , and the 
variances of the two structural shocks in each regime). However, in a simultaneous equation system 
subject to a regime switch as in (2), we need two additional restrictions to identify the two extra 
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used by recent empirical studies based upon heteroscedasticity as an identifying scheme are difficult 
to defend in this specific context. Specifically, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) impose a zero exclusion 
restriction on the impact multiplier matrix, while Rigobon (2003) assumes one of the structural 
shocks to be homoscedastic. Both these assumptions are hard to justify when considering the 
linkages between developed and emerging markets, and how they are affected by the occurrence of 
a crisis, which can be seen as a regime switch.
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As in Caporale et al. (2002), our main focus is the estimation of the coefficients a  and a , which 
measure the degree of co-movement between asset returns during normal periods, and the
coefficients a +a  and a +a , which measure the degree of co-movement between asset returns 
during crisis periods. If we find that the coefficients a  and a  corresponding to the dummy are 
statistically significant, we conclude that there is evidence for contagion. Assuming that the 
structural innovations are Gaussian, the conditional log-likelihood (ignoring the constant term) is:
01 02
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To explicitly recognize the existence of heteroscedasticity, we use the following GARCH(1,1) 
specification for the variance of both equations: 
          (3)
The normalization to unity of both unconditional variances (see King, Sentana, and Wadhwani, 
1994, and Normandin and Phaneuf, 1997, for relevant applications) adds the two additional 
restrictions which solve the system given by (2) and, consequently, identify the system given by (1).
We maximize the joint log-likelihood  L  over the parameters of the conditional mean and variance 
equations by using the simplex algorithm in the first few iterations and then the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. The Quasi Maximum Likelihood (see Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge, 1992) estimator was used in order to obtain robust standard errors.
St t
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We use weekly stock returns for five developed countries (the major international lenders: Japan, 
U.S., Germany, U.K. and France), and for the four largest economies in the East Asian region 
which were most heavily affected by the crisis (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia). The 
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has been chosen in order to avoid any overlap with the Russian crisis of August 1998. All series 
have been obtained from Datastream, and the package RATS was utilized for the computations. 
The choice of the breakpoint, corresponding to the beginning or the end of the contagion period, is 
clearly crucial. Therefore, as in Caporale et al. (2002), we carried out robustness analysis on the 
statistical significance of the coefficients a  and a  by considering a number of different 
specifications for the step dummy (we allowed the starting date for contagion to range from July 
1997 to July 1998). The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
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Concerning the normal periods, we find evidence of inter-linkages across stock markets (e.g. the 
coefficients a  and a  are statistically significant) for any specification of the step dummy. 
However, the evidence regarding contagion is mixed. Specifically, we first looked at the possibility 
of contagion from the developed to the East Asian countries. It appears that the U.S. has a 
contagious influence only on Thailand for all possible specifications of the step dummy. The U.K. 
has a contagious influence only on Thailand and Malaysia when considering as the beginning of 
contagion the period ranging from November 1997 onwards and from December 1997 onwards. 
Japan has a contagious influence on all four Asian economies (on Korea for all possible 
specifications of the step dummy; on Thailand when considering as the beginning of contagion the 
period ranging from November 1997 onwards; on Malaysia when considering as the beginning of 
contagion the period ranging from January 1998; on Indonesia when considering as the beginning 
of contagion the period ranging from February 1998 onwards). We did not find evidence of 
contagion from Germany and France to the East Asian countries. 
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When we looked at the possibility of contagion effects from the East Asian countries to the 
developed economies, we found evidence of feedback only on Japan (from Thailand when 
considering as the beginning of contagion the period ranging from January 1998 onwards; from 
Indonesia when considering as the beginning of contagion the period ranging from February 1998 
onwards; from Malaysia and Korea when considering as the beginning of contagion the period 
ranging from March 1998 onwards). 
The empirical evidence suggests that, if there is contagion, it tends to occur not at the onset of the 
crisis (corresponding to the Thai baht devaluation in July 1997), but with some considerable delay.
Hence, for brevity, we report in Table 1 and Table 2 the results for a model specification where the 
step dummy takes value 1 from February 1998 to July 1998. Specifically, in Table 1 we report the 
estimation results for the coefficients a  and a  (t-ratio in parenthesis) suggesting statistically 
significant inter-linkages for each pair of the countries in the tranquil period. In Table 2 we report 
the estimation results for the coefficient a and a  corresponding to the step dummy as specified 





Overall, the results indicate lack of contagion from the East Asian to the developed countries. One 
possible explanation for these empirical findings is the reversal in bank lending, especially in the 
case of Japan (the main international lender to the East Asian countries). The Bank for International 
Settlements official statistics (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999) clearly show 
that Western and Japanese banks quickly moved to reduce their claims on East Asian residents from 
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increased their exposures to Latin American and East European borrowers in the first half of 1998. 
This drastic reduction of international lending in the last two quarters of 1997 had a contagious 
effect on the East Asian countries (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2001).
Finally, the identification scheme adopted here was supported empirically by the presence of 
conditional heteroscedasticity. Since estimation of the full system (given by equations 1 and 3) 
yielded sums of the estimated coefficients  +   and  +  nearly equal to unity, we re-estimated 
the system by imposing an IGARCH (Integrated Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally 
Heteroscedastic) structure. We obtained similar results, since, as shown by Sentana and Fiorentini 
(2001), the IGARCH specification does not affect the identification of the system (though the 
constant part of the conditional variance should be restricted to unity in this case). Finally, a Ljung-
Box test on the squared standardized residuals shows no evidence of remaining heteroscedasticity.
d1 d2 d3 d4
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined whether during the 1997 East Asian crisis there was any contagion 
from the four largest economies in the region (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia) to a 
number of developed countries (Japan, U.S., U.K., Germany and France). Following Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) and Rigobon (2003), we have tested for contagion as a positive shift in the degree 
of co-movement between asset returns, taking into account heteroscedasticity and endogeneity bias. 
However, we have also relied on more plausible (over)identifying restrictions by carrying out a full 
sample test for the stability of a structural form system, as suggested by Caporale et al. (2002). The 
estimation results show that the impact of the East Asian crisis on developed financial markets was 
small. Risk diversification through reallocation of bank loans, a substantial decrease of the exposure 
to East Asian countries on the part of Western and Japanese banks, and prudential supervision and 
regulation reduced the impact of the East Asian crisis on the developed economies. By contrast, the 
drastic reduction of international lending in the last two quarters of 1997 had a significant 
contagious effect on the East Asian economies.
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 Each entry corresponding to the i-th row and the j-th column gives the point estimates of two coefficients (t-
ratios in parenthesis): the l.h.s coefficient measures the influence of the j-th explanatory variable on the i-th dependent 
variable, and the r.h.s coefficient measures the influence of the i-th explanatory variable on the j-th dependent variable 
For instance, the two coefficients in the row labelled JP and in the column labelled THA describe the influence, during 
the calm period, of Thailand on Japan and of Japan on Thailand, respectively. The mnemonics are as follows: JP stands 
for Japan, US for United States, UK for United Kingdom, GER for Germany, FR for France, THA for Thailand, KO for 
Korea, ID for Indonesia and MY for Malaysia.
Note:
Table 2: Estimation of the coefficients a  and a 11 12

















































































 See the note in Table 1. In addition, the 5% critical value is 1.65, and numbers in bold indicate evidence of 
contagion.
Note:
10/2/03 9:45 AM Working Paper 370
Page 7 of 8 http://www.levy.org/docs/wrkpap/papers/370.htmlNOTES 
1. During the early 1990s there was a remarkable growth in international bank lending to Asian 
countries in order to capitalize on the growth opportunities in Asia during the early 1990s. 
Furthermore, local "Firms discovered that they could borrow abroad half as cheaply as at 
home" (Arestis and Glickman, 2002, p. 248); those relatively high interest rates generated 
large capital inflows into the Asian region, given the small exchange rate and country risk 
premia attached to each country in the region. 
2. Recent research stresses that contagion is often confused with interdependence, and that 
apparent contagion is frequently the result of common shocks (see, for example, Neal and 
Weidenmier, 2002). 
3. Homoscedasticity in the innovations to D y  and D y  can be justified by noting that they 
describe the behavior of the endogenous variables only during the crisis period.
t 1t t 2t
 
4. See Corsetti et al. (1999) for more details of the Asian crisis. 
5. The results of these diagnostic tests and all additional estimates and diagnostics, including 
those of IGARCH (see below) are available upon request.
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